This article analyzes the impact of race-based redistricting and the Republican trend on party competition in races for the U.S. House of Representatives in the South from 1988 to 2000. The region is divided into sub-regions (Deep and Peripheral) in order to show that the combination of reapportionment and newly created majority black districts disproportionately crowds out white Democratic representatives in the Deep South. It is argued that race-based redistricting serves as an accelerating mechanism that hastens the secular realignment of whites into the Republican Party. Aggregate and individual level data are presented to illustrate the effect of the Republican trend and majority black districts on party competition and voting behavior in congressional elections.
Introduction
The increase in African-American representatives in the South after the 1992 U.S. House elections has taken place alongside a drastic reduction in white Democratic representatives. There were 69 white Democrats in 1988. After the 2000 elections there are 32 white Democrats. What can account for the massive decline of white Democrats, and by extension, the Democratic Party in the South? It is my contention that a secular realignment of whites into the Republican Party is the answer. Race-based redistricting is a vital component of this realignment because it has served to expedite the process, especially in the Deep South 1 where a lack of seat-gains combined with race-based redistricting has pushed white Democrats to the brink of extinction.
This study proceeds in four sections. Section one presents an overview of party competition from 1988 to 2000. I present electoral data to highlight the Republican trend in southern House races. In section two I present a model of vote choice to provide micro-level support for the Republican trend. The effects of race-based redistricting are discussed in section three. I argue that the combination of reapportionment and race-based redistricting account for the relatively greater reduction of white Democrats in the Deep South. And in section four, I present a model of vote choice to illustrate that white southerners living in the Deep South are significantly more likely to favor Republican candidates even after controlling for several variables that affect party preference. I split the South into Deep and Peripheral states because the decline in the electoral fortunes of southern Democrats is not proportional across sub-regions.
Generally speaking, the southern electorate is racially polarized. This means that in congressional elections a majority of whites prefer candidates opposed by a majority of blacks. In partisan terms, most whites vote Republican and most blacks vote Democratic. The reduction in the black votingage population (BVAP) of districts adjacent to majority-minority districts severely handicaps white Democratic representatives by taking away their most loyal voters. White Democrats also suffer because majority-minority districts are altered to ensure the election of a minority candidate, and the packing of blacks in these majority-minority districts aids Republicans in bordering districts with reduced BVAPs. In other words, there is not a oneto-one exchange between the parties: black Democrats replace white Democrats, and Republicans defeat additional white Democrats running in districts with higher white voting-age populations as a consequence of race-based redistricting. Therefore, the direct and indirect effect of race-based redistricting reduces the total number of Democrats in the South.
My central contention in this study is that race-based redistricting prior to the 1992 U.S. House elections has served to accelerate the extant realignment of southern whites into the Republican Party. Race plays an essential role in deciding the outcomes of southern House elections, and majorityminority districts, in effect, enhance the importance of race with respect to vote choice.
Party Competition, 1988-2000: The Republican Trend
At the start of the 1990s there was scant evidence of an impending partisan realignment that would by the end of the decade leave the Democratic Party firmly in the minority. In this section I document the ascendancy of the Republican Party in southern House races by presenting data on party competition in general elections from 1988 to 2000 . In 1988 , the southern House delegation consisted of 39 Republicans and 77 Democrats. After the 2000 elections, there were 71 Republicans and 53 Democrats. Table 1 shows a net gain of nine seats for Republicans in 1992 which is the first election held after reapportionment and the creation of 12 new majority black districts. In hindsight it is clear that 1992 was the election that triggered a punctuated change leading to a new electoral balance with the Republican Party maintaining majority status since 1994. By dividing the southern House seats by sub-region, it is evident that the Democratic Party Republicans and the concomitant decline of Democrats. We see in What is striking is the speed of this partisan realignment. In only two elections Republican advancement results in majority control of the southern House delegation. 1992 is the critical election that triggers the change resulting in a new balance, with the Republican Party finally obtaining control of the House in 1994. The steady secular realignment in favor of the Republican Party, which began in 1964 at the presidential level with Goldwater's "southern strategy" (see Phillips 1969; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Davidson 1990; Aistrup 1996; Black and Black 2002) , gave way to a sudden electoral flashpoint with the Republican Party taking control of the House in a span of two elections.
The Republican Trend and Voting Behavior
In this section I present two multivariate vote choice models that include election years as dummy variables in order to measure the Republican trend in southern congressional elections. My assumption is that after controlling for a host of variables that are expected to impact vote choice, the election year variables will remain significant if there is a Republican trend in southern House races. I use the National Election Studies Cumulative File (1948 File ( -2000 because it provides an adequate number of cases and In order to avoid the complication of presidential elections, I run two models, the first for midterm elections (1990, 1994, and 1998) and the second for presidential election years (1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000) . In both models, the dependent variable equals 1 for a vote in favor of a Republican House candidate and 0 for a Democrat. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, I run logistic regression. The midterm equation is as follows:
This equation states that the probability an individual voter votes for a Republican House candidate (as opposed to a Democratic candidate) is a function of income, race (Black = 1, White = 0), party identification (PID), whether there is a Republican incumbent running for reelection, whether the respondent lives in the Deep South (as opposed to Peripheral South), and the year of the election. Independent is the baseline (omitted) category for party identification. The reference year from which 1994 and 1998 are measured against is 1990.
The presidential years equation is as follows:
The only difference in equation 2 is the inclusion of a dummy variable for whether the respondent voted for the Republican presidential candidate 4 (Rep = 1, Dem = 0) and the dummy variables for presidential years 1992, 1996, and 2000, compared with 1988 , the omitted category. For the midterm model, after accounting for income, race, party identification, Republican incumbency, and sub-region, respondents were still significantly more likely to vote for a Republican House candidate in 1994 and 1998 compared to respondents in 1990. For example, holding all the remaining variables at their mean values, the probability that a white Democrat living in the Peripheral South in a district with a Republican incumbent running for reelection votes Republican in 1990 is 55.3 percent. In 1994, a respondent with these characteristics has a 77.1 percent probability of voting Republican. And in 1998, the probability is 87.2 percent. The results for the presidential years model are more promising. Every coefficient has the correct sign. Whereas just two variables (Democrat PID and Republican Incumbent) apart from the year dummies are statistically significant in the midterm model, the Republican dummy is the only covariate that is not significant in the presidential years model. Controlling for all the variables in the presidential years model, individuals in 1992, 1996, and 2000 are significantly more likely to vote Republican in House elections compared to persons in 1988.
It makes intuitive sense that 1992 makes the strongest impact on the probability of voting Republican in House races because Republican candidates had the most success in this presidential election year (see Table 3 ). Take for example a white Democrat in a district with no Republican incumbent who lives in the Peripheral South and votes for George Bush in 1992. There is a 47.4 percent chance this individual votes for the Republican House candidate. Given these same characteristics, an individual has only a 14.7 percent probability of voting for a Republican House candidate in 1988. Compared to 1988 (the presidential years model) and 1990 (the midterm model), and controlling for many factors expected to influence vote choice, the election year variables highlight the Republican trend in voting behavior in southern House elections.
Race-Based Redistricting
After the 1992 congressional elections, the number of black U.S. House of Representatives in the South more than tripled, increasing from five to seventeen members. The explanation for this explosion is closely related to a position taken by the Justice Department: the 1982 amendments (Sections 2 and 5) to the Voting Rights Act (VRA), as interpreted by the Reagan and Bush administrations (Department of Justice), required the creation of a maximum number of majority-minority districts following the 1990 Census (Clayton 2000) . Although the latest legal interpretation backs off of this position (Easley v. Cromartie 2001) , because race can no longer be the "dominant and controlling" 6 consideration in drawing the lines for a district, there nonetheless remain sixteen 7 black representatives in the South, and most of them represent majority black districts (MBDs).
8
If we hold all other factors constant, Democratic candidates have an electoral advantage in districts with high black and Hispanic voting-age populations (Lublin 1997; Handley et al. 1998 ). Conversely, Republican contenders have a definite edge in districts that have a large proportion of white (non-Hispanic) residents. The 1992 redistricting revealed the importance of race in regard to vote choice as congressional boundaries were drawn to favor Democratic contenders in newly created majority-minority districts. In the South, as a byproduct of race-based redistricting, Republican candidates received an electoral boon in several districts that bordered majority black districts because the white voting-age populations in the former were substantially increased.
9
White Democrats have suffered their greatest losses in the Deep South, with a net loss of nine seats in 1992. In 1988 there were 24 white Democrats in the Deep South. After the 2000 elections there are five. By way of comparison, in 1988 there were ten white Republicans in the Deep South. Now there are 24. As mentioned previously, black Democrats outnumber white Democrats in the Deep South (7 to 5).
I propose two interdependent explanations as to why white Democrats have lost more seats in the Deep South: (1) race-based redistricting has its greatest negative impact on white Democrats in the Deep South because of the greater scarcity of seats (relative to the Peripheral South), and (2) the reduction in the black voting-age populations (BVAPs) of districts bordering newly created MBDs favored Republican candidates. Race-based redistricting constitutes a direct loss of white Democratic seats, whereas the resultant decline in the BVAPs of surrounding districts is the indirect loss, because so-called "bleached" districts favor Republican candidates (see Hill 1995; Petrocik and Desposato 1998) . Table 5 displays all of the newly created majority black districts in the South by sub-region for the 1992 congressional elections. As shown in the table, with a gain of nine seats after apportionment, the more populous Peripheral South states were more capable of absorbing newly created majority black districts. In other words, none of the MBDs in the Peripheral South had boundaries drawn at the direct expense of incumbents. This was not the case in the Deep South states of Alabama (AL 7), Georgia (GA 2), and South Carolina (SC 6). These states had newly created MBDs that comprised the greater portion of existing districts presided over by white Democrats (and thus these districts are not designated as "Newly Created Districts" in the table even though all districts presented are by definition newly created MBDs). Nonetheless, and to a lesser extent (compared to the Deep South states), some of the Peripheral South states were also spread too thin (especially North Carolina, which gained one seat but had to set aside two districts as MBDs), with several Democratic candidates in the surrounding districts losing too many black voters to be able to hold the line in the face of a powerful Republican tide.
The Deep South states broke even with respect to their total number of seats following the 1990 Census. Georgia was the only state to add a seat, Louisiana lost a seat, and the number of seats remained the same in : 1946 : -1966 : (CQ 1998 Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Mississippi is the only Deep South state that did not create a new majority black district. Although Georgia added a seat, it was also required to form two MBDs. Louisiana, the only southern state to lose a seat, created one MBD (LA 4). 10 Alabama and South Carolina each had to add one MBD. In Table 5 it is evident that racebased redistricting, coupled with a lack of population growth (newly created MBDs that are not "Newly Created Districts"), resulted in the direct loss of three white Democrats in the Deep South, two who decided to retire and one who lost to a black candidate in the Democratic primary. Now I turn to the second part of the explanation for Republican gains and Democratic losses as a consequence of race-based redistricting. To see if it is indeed the case that Republican success stemmed from a reduction in the BVAPs of districts bordering newly created MBDs, I evaluate all eight seats won by white Republicans in 1992.
11 Since white Democrats held these seats in 1990, I present the percent Democratic vote (two-party), white voting-age population (WVAP), and BVAP in 1990. These figures are contrasted with the percent Republican vote, WVAP, and BVAP in 1992. I also indicate whether the seat bordered a newly created MBD as well as the status of the seat for the 1992 House races.
The results from Table 6 are consistent with the finding (see Hill 1995) that, in the South, the 1992 redistricting favored the electoral fortunes of white Republicans at the expense of white Democrats by significantly reducing the BVAP in several districts that bordered newly created MBDs. In 1992, the average increase in WVAP for the districts bordering newly created MBDs is 10 percent and the average decline in BVAP is 37 percent. The large gains in WVAP and even greater reductions in BVAP all come from districts that border newly created MBDs. The white Democrats who held these seats in 1990 lost an indispensable portion of their voting base as a consequence of race-based redistricting.
Vote Choice and Sub-region, Support for Realignment at the Individual Level
Given the decline of white Democrats in the Deep South, an analysis of voting behavior should provide evidence that white voters residing in the Deep South are more likely to vote Republican compared to their counterparts in the Peripheral South. In this section I present a model of vote choice that controls for several factors known to influence voter preference in House races. This model serves as a behavioral linkage to the aggregate level data I presented in Tables 1, 2 , and 3 in order to document the ascendancy of the Republican Party in southern House elections. Because the Republican trend is stronger in the Deep South (see the presidential years model in Table 4 ), I expect that whites in the Deep South are significantly more likely to vote Republican versus whites in the Peripheral South even after controlling for a host of variables that influence vote choice.
The model is as follows:
In this equation, the probability that one votes for a Republican House candidate as opposed to a Democrat depends on party identification, whether a Democrat or Republican incumbent is running for reelection, income, and 
Conclusion
Since 1994, Republicans have maintained a solid majority of southern U.S. House seats. By 1996, white Republicans outnumber white Democrats more than two to one. White Republicans have benefited from the creation of majority black districts, because, unlike white Democrats, they do not rely upon a racial coalition to win elections (Lamis 1988; Black 1998; Black and Black 2002) . Unfortunately for white Democrats, following the 1990 reapportionment, the boundaries for majority black districts were created primarily from portions of districts that were presided over by white Democrats. A high plurality to majority BVAP practically guarantees victory for black candidates (see Epstein and O'Halloran 1999) . Similarly, racial polarization aids white Republican candidates because the reduction in black population in majority white districts translates into more Republican support (Petrocik and Desposato 1998) . In Key's masterpiece Southern Politics, he states: "[w]hatever phase of the southern political process one seeks to understand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro" (Key 1984 (Key [1949 , 5). Over half a century has passed since these famous words were recorded and yet they still hold true. From 1988 to 2000, race plays a central role in deciding the outcome of southern House races. Court decisions mandated the creation of 12 majority black districts in 1992. The resultant increase in black members has exacted a heavy toll on the Democratic Party. More black representation has meant less Democratic representation because too many blacks remain concentrated in majority black districts (Swain 1993) . In short, the concentration of black constituents in majority black districts has had the effect of crowding out white Democratic representatives because they are more dependent upon a mixture of black and white support to win House races. The biracial coalition that worked so effectively for white Democratic candidates (see Glaser 1996) has been severed by the creation of majority black districts.
The secular realignment of southern whites into the Republican Party took on the unmistakable look of a critical realignment in 1994. Republican ascendancy was hastened by the 1992 redistricting because it had the effect of displacing white Democrats (especially in the Deep South) who represented the greater parts of districts set aside for black candidates. In addition, the reduction of black voting-age populations in districts bordering newly created MBDs advantages Republican candidates. In the Deep South there are more black Democrats than white Democrats. Given the scant number of white Democrats, it is no wonder that the voting behavior of Deep South whites reveals a strong preference for Republican candidates. It will certainly be interesting to investigate the next phase of southern House races with the next election being the first with the new district lines based on the 2000 census. I make no predictions for 2002, but suffice it to say that pretty soon Republicans will only be able to move in one direction.
NOTES
6 Quoted from Linda Greenhouse, "Justices Permit Race as a Factor in Redistricting," The New York Times, 19 April 2001, p.1. 7 After the 2000 House elections, ten of the sixteen black members reside in majority black districts.
8 By definition, a majority black district has a black population over 50 percent. There are nine majority Hispanic districts (MHDs) in the South. Hispanic Republicans represent three, Hispanic Democrats five, and a white Democrat represents one MHD (TX 29).
9 Petrocik and Desposato (1998) emphasize that it is not just a larger white votingage population that benefits Republican candidates, but rather voters are more inclined to vote Republican in these "bleached" districts. 10 According to census data, redistricting before the 1996 election reduced the BVAP in LA 4 to 29.2 percent.
11 The remaining southern seat won by Republicans in 1992 is TX 23, a Hispanic Republican challenger (Henry Bonilla) defeated the Hispanic Democratic incumbent (Albert G. Bustamante).
